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Abstract 
There is evidence for both advantages and disadvantages in normal recognition of 
living over non-living things. This paradox has been attributed to high levels of 
perceptual similarity within living categories having a different effect on performance in 
different contexts. However, since living things are intrinsically more similar to each 
other, previous studies could not determine whether the various category effects were due 
to perceptual similarity, or to other characteristics of living things. We used novel animal 
and vehicle stimuli that were matched for similarity to measure the influence of 
perceptual similarity in different contexts. We found that displaying highly similar 
objects in blocked sets reduced their perceived similarity, eliminating the detrimental 
effect on naming performance. Experiment 1 demonstrated a disadvantage for highly 
similar objects in name-learning and name-verification using mixed groups of similar and 
dissimilar animals and vehicles. Experiment 2 demonstrated no disadvantage for the same 
highly similar objects when they were blocked, e.g. similar animals presented alone. 
Thus, perceptual similarity, rather than other characteristics particular to living things, is 
affected by context, and could create apparent category effects under certain testing 
conditions. 
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Measuring the Influence of Similarity on Category-Specific Effects 
Studies investigating category-specific effects in normal processing have 
suggested that high levels of similarity within categories of living things can cause 
objects from these categories to be harder to process (e.g. Gaffan & Heywood, 1993; 
Humphreys, Riddoch & Quinlan, 1988; Lloyd-Jones & Humphreys, 1997; Shapiro & 
Olson, 2005; Vitkovitch & Tyrrell, 1995). However, recent studies have indicated that 
similarity has a different influence on performance, depending on the testing conditions 
(Gerlach, 2001; Lag, 2005; Lloyd-Jones & Luckhurst, 2002). For example, Gerlach 
(2001) found a disadvantage for living things in a difficult object decision task (i.e. 
requiring high levels of perceptual differentiation) when viewing conditions were optimal 
(so that perceptual detail could be used in the decision). In contrast, Gerlach found an 
advantage for living things when the object decision task was easy (i.e. requiring low 
levels of perceptual differentiation), and viewing conditions were sub-optimal (stimuli 
were presented in the periphery, reducing the amount of perceptual detail that could be 
used in the decision).  
Gerlach (2001) suggested that the category-effect reversed under different testing 
conditions because the influence of perceptual similarity acts in opposite directions in 
different contexts. However, since he was unable to control perceptual similarity across 
the living and non-living items in his study, he could not be certain that it was the high 
levels of similarity within the living categories that caused the various category-effects he 
observed or other characteristics specific to living things. In order to determine whether 
the influence of perceptual similarity varies under different contexts, we employed a set 
of novel living and non-living stimuli from Shapiro and Olson (2005) that were matched 
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for perceptual similarity. These images were used to compare the effects of similarity 
when items were presented in mixed vs. blocked sets. The effects of similarity should be 
strongest when highly similar items are presented in a mixed set containing objects from 
both similar and dissimilar categories. For example, animals may appear highly similar to 
each other in the context of other dissimilar categories (such as furniture, vehicles, office 
stationery). In contrast, the items should be perceived as less similar when the other 
categories are taken away and we are able to focus on the features that differ, effectively 
increasing the separation between items in similarity space (Livingston, Andrews & 
Harnad, 1998). In sum, when highly similar items are presented alone (i.e. in a blocked 
set), these high levels of similarity should no longer have such a detrimental effect on 
naming performance. 
Context and Similarity Effects 
Gerlach’s (2001) account of the reversal of category-effects under different 
testing conditions (see also Lag, 2005; Lloyd-Jones & Luckhurst, 2002) is consistent with 
the view that we adapt our perceptual processing according to task demands. There are 
two main literatures that relate to this account. Firstly, explicit judgments of similarity 
have been shown to change in different contexts, supporting the view of similarity as 
flexible and context dependent (e.g. Bassock & Medin, 1997; Goldsone, Medin & 
Halberstadt, 1997; Medin, Goldstone & Gentner, 1993; Tversky, 1977). Secondly, 
conceptual knowledge interacts with lower level perceptual processes, causing the 
discriminability of objects to vary according to task demands (e.g. Livingston et al., 
1998; Gauthier, James, Curby & Tarr, 2003; Hayes, Taplin & Longstaff, 2002). We will 
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briefly outline these two literatures, before explaining how they relate to the current 
study. 
Research on similarity judgements. 
Parducci’s (1965) range-frequency model of category judgement would predict 
that similarity judgements should be context-dependent. Parducci proposed that category 
judgements reflect a compromise between the range and frequency principles. This 
theory assumes that a participant judging stimuli on a fixed range (e.g. from small to 
large), would subdivide their psychological range into categories (i.e. small and large), 
and their judgements would be influenced by the stimulus frequencies. Ranks of the 
middle stimuli would increase when more small stimuli are added to the sample. In 
contrast, the ranks of the middle stimuli would decrease when more large stimuli were 
added to the sample. If this theory were applied to pair-wise similarity judgements within 
a fixed range from dissimilar to similar, ranks of the middle pairs would increase when 
more dissimilar pairs were added to the set, but ranks of the middle pairs would decrease 
when more similar pairs were added to the set. Thus, stimuli would be judged as less 
similar if they are presented in the context of many other highly similar items. 
The extent to which similarity is context-dependent is central to the debate as to 
the power of similarity, as opposed to rules (or conceptual/semantic knowledge), to 
explain human categorisation. Sloman and Rips (1998) describe a continuum from 
“strong similarity”, defined as an automatic perceptual process, through to “no 
similarity”, a complete rejection of the usefulness of similarity as a construct. There are 
strong arguments against both the strong view and the rejection view, but there is 
convincing evidence for a weak view of similarity as a context-dependent process, where 
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the precise computation is based on a set of properties, that vary depending on the 
representations used as the input. Goldstone and Barsalou (1998) provide a powerful 
argument for this view of similarity, stressing the interplay between perceptual 
mechanisms and abstract thought. Support for this view is provided by evidence that 
judgements of similarity are mediated by: prior judgements (Lasaline, 1996; Wedell, 
1996); exposure to metaphors (Kelly & Keil, 1987); separation of test items by a delay 
(Wedell, 1996) and the particular items presented in the comparison set (Bassock & 
Medin, 1997; Goldsone et al, 1997, Medin, Goldstone & Gentner, 1993, Tversky, 1977). 
For example, Goldstone et al. (1997) found that similarity judgements were influenced by 
the context within a single trial, so that a target could be judged to be more similar to 
stimulus A than stimulus B on one trial, more similar to B than C on another trial yet 
inconsistently be judged as more similar to C than A on another trial. In a second 
experiment, they demonstrated that the relative similarity of two alternatives to the target 
was influenced by a third alternative. A third experiment demonstrated that the 
dimensions that are used to make the similarity judgement are foregrounded or 
backgrounded, depending on the set of displayed objects. Together, these studies suggest 
that similarity judgements are not stable, and instead, vary according to the context in 
which the comparison is made. 
Research on context and object discriminability. 
The studies we have outlined so far have measured explicit similarity judgements, 
whereas we are specifically interested in whether context can influence the 
discriminability of stimuli used in a naming task. In terms of Parducci’s (1965) range-
frequency model, a group of similar items should be perceived as less similar to each 
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other when presented on their own (in a blocked stimulus set) than when they are 
presented together with other dissimilar items (in a mixed set).  In a blocked set, the 
psychological distance between similar items would be expanded because the anchor 
point for what is considered dissimilar would change, and because the number of similar 
items would increase as a proportion of the whole stimulus set. The most dissimilar of the 
similar items would seem more dissimilar in a blocked set in the same way that a middle-
sized stimulus seems larger when presented in a set composed of primarily small stimuli. 
The most compelling evidence that context influences object discriminability 
comes from categorical perception: our perception that the distance between a pair of 
items that cross a category boundary is greater than between equidistant pairs of items 
within the same category (Liberman, Harris, Hoffman, & Griffith, 1957). Whereas initial 
investigations suggested that categorical perception was confined to innate perceptual 
categories of colour and sounds (e.g. Bornstein, Kessen, & Weiskopf, 1976; Eimas, 
Siqueland, Jusczyk, & Vigorito, 1971), recent research has demonstrated that categorical 
perception can be acquired (Ozgen & Davies, 2002, Goldstone, 1994; Livingston et al., 
1998). Livingston et al. trained participants to categorise two-dimensional stimuli or 
pictures of real objects, and found that training induced within-category compression 
effects, indicating that learning changes the dimensional structure of perceptual similarity 
space. Similarly, Goldstone (1994) found that object discriminability could be mediated 
by changing the categorisation condition. Goldstone trained subjects to categorise 
objects, with one relevant dimension, and one irrelevant dimension. When subjects were 
then asked to make same/different judgements, subjects’ discrimination sensitivity was 
greater when the pair varied on a dimension that was previously relevant in the 
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categorisation condition. These studies suggest that perceptual processes are influenced 
by our conceptual knowledge and can be manipulated according to task demands. 
The cascade model (Humphreys et al., 1988) predicts that object discriminability 
critically affects naming performance. In this model, perceptual similarity influences 
processing during access to stored structural descriptions, when competing structural 
descriptions that are perceptually similar to the target are activated. More distracters 
would be activated for objects with many highly similar neighbours, and this would 
therefore critically affect the speed with which the correct description is chosen. Since 
processing is assumed to operate in cascade, these distracters continue to be activated 
during semantic processing, and so perceptual similarity directly affects semantic access 
and name retrieval. If the context in which objects are displayed causes fewer competing 
structural descriptions to be activated, then we would expect naming to be facilitated. 
In sum, the research on similarity judgements suggests that object representations 
are flexible and change according to the context in which a comparison is made. In 
addition, research on the interaction between conceptual knowledge and perception 
indicates that context can impact on perceptual processing, and thus affect naming 
performance. 
The Current Study 
The current study investigated whether the influence of perceptual similarity on 
naming is mediated by the context in which stimuli are presented. We used the novel 
animal and vehicle images from Shapiro and Olson (2005) to measure the effects of 
similarity and category under different learning and testing conditions. For this set of 
images, perceptual similarity is matched across the living and non-living items, allowing 
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us to determine whether any change in perceived similarity among items is consistent for 
both living and non-living categories. Although our stimuli are novel, they are plausible 
examples of living and non-living things. Shapiro and Olson (2005) conducted extensive 
pre-tests to ensure that participants processed the images as examples of the intended 
categories. Fifteen participants almost always categorised the images correctly as animals 
and vehicles (as opposed to “either” or “neither”), with 95% accuracy for the similar 
vehicles, 97% accuracy for the dissimilar animals and 98% accuracy for similar animals 
and dissimilar vehicles. Ten other participants completed a nearest-neighbour 
questionnaire, where they were asked to state the first real object that came into their 
head on viewing each image for the first time. Only two responses (‘‘teddy bear’’ for 
animal and ‘‘cake on wheels’’ for vehicle) out of 160 (ten participants responding to 16 
images) were inconsistent with the intended category. Ten further participants completed 
a detailed semantic properties questionnaire immediately after they had completed 
training and name-verification for the images. Participants did not view the images when 
filling in the questionnaire, and were asked to respond from memory. Two naïve judges, 
who had not seen the images, scored 94% of the responses to vehicles as appropriate for 
an object from the vehicle category and 97% of the responses to animals as appropriate 
for an object from the animal category. The responses to vehicles that were coded as 
inappropriate can be explained by participants’ frequent use of the term “wings” for the 
similar vehicles (plane-type vehicles) which was coded as an animal response by the 
judges, and the responses to animals that were coded as inappropriate can be explained 
by participants’ frequent use of the term “shiny” to describe one of the animals (AD2- 
fish-type animal). Although these results indicate that our images are largely processed as 
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new members of existing animal and vehicle categories, it is unlikely that the entire 
object recognition process is the same as for examples of real objects. Thus, we will be 
cautious in our interpretation of any category effects we observe and will return to this 
issue in the discussion section. 
One further issue is that time constraints may have a different impact on 
recognition for different types of object. Specifically, category effects may not be 
observable under unlimited time conditions, but may become apparent when there is 
pressure to respond quickly. To address this issue, we asked participants to respond under 
long and short deadlines to ensure that we did not miss categorical differences that are 
only apparent when responses must be made quickly. 
Predictions. 
Following Gerlach (2001), we hypothesise that high levels of perceptual 
similarity among living things creates apparent category effects in certain contexts. Since 
our living and non-living stimuli are controlled for perceptual similarity, we expect no 
main effects of category in either experiment. However, we predict that the effects of 
perceptual similarity will vary with context. Following Shapiro and Olson’s (2005) 
observations about the influence of similarity on name-learning and name-verification, 
we anticipate that performance will be worse for highly similar objects when we present 
our stimuli in a mixed set, e.g. dissimilar animals alongside similar vehicles (Experiment 
1). In contrast, when the images are presented in blocked sets, e.g. similar vehicles alone, 
the similar vehicles will appear less similar to each other when presented in isolation, 
resulting in a non-significant effect of similarity (Experiment 2). 
Methods 
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Stimuli 
The same set of 16 images was used for both Experiments 1 and 2, taken from Shapiro 
and Olson (2005) (see Appendix A). These images were associated with a set of 16 novel 
names, also taken from Shapiro and Olson (see Appendix B). The set of images consisted 
of 4 similar animals, 4 dissimilar animals, 4 similar vehicles and 4 dissimilar vehicles. 
The animal and vehicle images were matched for similarity and familiarity, according to 
ratings collected by Shapiro and Olson. For the similarity pre-test, 15 participants rated 
all within-condition pairs of images (48 pairs) in random order using a scale from 1 to 5 
(1 = a pair of images that looked nothing like each other, 5 = a pair of images that were 
almost identical). As expected, the similar animals and vehicles were rated as 
significantly more similar than the dissimilar animals and vehicles. There was no main 
effect of category, indicating that the animals and vehicles were equivalent in their 
within-category similarity, and there was no interaction between similarity and category. 
For the familiarity pre-test, 15 participants rated all 16 images one at a time using a scale 
from 1 to 5 (1 = a very unusual image, 5 = a very familiar image). There was no main 
effect of category indicating that the animals and vehicles were equally familiar, no main 
effect of similarity indicating that the similar and dissimilar images were equally familiar, 
and there was no interaction between category and similarity. In addition, pre-tests 
indicated that participants readily categorised the images as animals and vehicles and 
responded appropriately in a semantic properties questionnaire (see Shapiro & Olson for 
a full report of the pre-test results). 
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Participants 
Forty-seven participants between the ages of 18 and 31 were tested, 15 
participants undertook Experiment 1 and 32 participants undertook Experiment 2. All 
were undergraduate or postgraduate students at Birmingham University and either gained 
course credits or cash payments for participating. 
Design and procedure 
In Experiment 1, the images were presented in mixed groups (e.g. similar animals 
and dissimilar vehicles), and in Experiment 2, the images were presented in blocked 
groups (e.g. similar animals). Experiment 1 had three repeated measures factors: 
similarity (dissimilar/similar), category (animal/vehicle) and deadline (long/short). In 
each sitting, participants were presented with 8 images, either dissimilar animals and 
similar vehicles together or similar animals and dissimilar vehicles together. The 
experiment took place in 2 sessions each lasting approximately one hour, conducted at 2-
day intervals. In the first session, participants learnt the names of eight images, followed 
by the name-verification tasks. In the second session, participants completed the training 
followed by name-verification tasks for the remaining eight images. Each set of eight 
images consisted of a living category and a non-living category, a similar category and a 
dissimilar category. The order of the groups in each session was counterbalanced 
between subjects. Experiment 2 had two between-subjects factors: similarity 
(similar/dissimilar) and category (animal/vehicle). As in Experiment 1, deadline was a 
repeated measures factor (long/short). Participants were presented with one group of 4 
images and completed the experiment in one sitting. Participants were assigned to 
dissimilar animals, similar animals, dissimilar vehicles or similar vehicles. 
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Training. 
An image was randomly selected from the set and displayed. Underneath the 
image was a selection of all possible names from the set in random order. The participant 
selected the appropriate name using the mouse. If the answer was incorrect, the correct 
name was displayed with the image. Accuracy was recorded during training. All images 
continued to be displayed in random order until the participant reached an accuracy 
criterion, at which point the training session terminated and participants were given a 
short break before continuing to the name-verification stage. The criterion in Experiment 
1 was 8 consecutive correct responses for each image. The criterion in Experiment 2 was 
increased to 20 correct responses per image. These criteria were chosen to ensure that 
participants were equally familiar with the images in each experiment and achieved 
similar performance levels. These criteria resulted in similar overall accuracy in the 
training sessions for the two experiments (see Tables 1 and 2 in the Results section) and 
similar overall accuracy in name-verification (discussed on p 18-19 in the Results 
section). 
Name-verification. 
Name verification was used to measure naming speed and accuracy (as in Lawson 
& Jolicoeur, 1998). Name-verification allowed us to measure response latencies much 
more precisely than in a naming task using a voice key. This task also allowed the 
response deadline to be manipulated (as in Brockdorff & Lamberts, 2000 and Lamberts, 
1995). After training, participants were given a name-verification task under time 
pressure. A name was presented for 800ms followed by an image, presented either for 
600ms (long deadline) or 400ms (short deadline). Participants had to decide as quickly as 
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possible whether or not the name and the image matched. Participants were asked to 
respond before the image disappeared, using a button box to indicate whether the name 
and the image matched (i.e. correct name) or did not match (i.e. incorrect name). When a 
response missed the deadline, a buzzer sounded and the message “Too slow- Try to 
respond before the beep”, appeared. No other feedback was given. The long deadline task 
was given followed by the short deadline task, with a practice session before each task. 
Each test session consisted of every possible combination of non-matching name and 
image and an equal number of matching name-image pairs. In Experiment 1, there were 
56 non-matching trials (8 images presented with each of 7 possible non-matching names) 
plus an equal number of matching trials (total 112 trials). In experiment 2, there were 12 
possible non-matching trials (4 images presented with each of 3 possible non-matching 
names). However, to ensure that participants had time to become accustomed to the tasks 
in Experiment 2, we doubled the number of trials to make 24 non-matching plus 24 
matching trials (total 48 trials). As shown in the Results section (see Figures 1 and 3), 
name-verification accuracy was roughly equivalent for the two experiments. This will be 
discussed further in the Results section of Experiment 2. RTs and errors were recorded. 
Results 
Experiment 1 
Data from 14 participants were analysed. One participant’s data were removed 
because of inappropriate responses in a semantic properties questionnaire conducted after 
this experiment (classification of all similar vehicles as living things, reported in Shapiro 
& Olson, 2005). The following analyses were conducted by participants (denoted by F1) 
and by image (denoted by F2). Analyses by participants allowed effects that are reliable 
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across participants to be observed, but would have been affected by a single image 
causing an inconsistent pattern of responses. In contrast, analyses by image allowed 
effects that are reliable across images to be observed, but would have been affected by 
individual participants responding in unusual ways. 
Training. 
Performance was significantly less accurate for the similar conditions: F1(1, 13) = 
21.57, MSE = 25.67, p < .001; F2(1, 12) = 14.52, MSE = 13.55, p < .001. The means are 
shown in Table 1. There was no significant effect of category, both F ≤ 1.40, p ≥.26, and 
no interaction on the analysis by participant: F1(1, 13) = 1.06, p = .32. However, the 
interaction was almost significant by image: F2(1, 12) = 4.15, MSE = 13.55, p = .06. As 
shown in Table 1, there was a trend for the difference between similar and dissimilar 
conditions to be less for the vehicles than the animals. Since the trend for a category by 
similarity interaction was observed only in the analysis by image, we can assume that this 
effect was reliable across images, but was not consistent across participants and therefore 
may indicate that a sub-set of participants were using a different learning strategy. In fact, 
two participants showed unusually poor performance for the dissimilar vehicles, relative 
to other conditions. One participant scored 75% for the dissimilar vehicles, compared to 
86% for the similar animals (the other condition learned in the same training session). 
Another participant scored 81% for the dissimilar vehicles and 86% for the similar 
animals. No other participant performed less accurately for the dissimilar vehicles than 
the similar animals. It is likely that these two participants decided to prioritise learning 
the harder condition (similar animals), and therefore focussed less on the easier condition 
(dissimilar vehicles) during training. No equivalent pattern of responding was observed in 
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the name-verification data for these participants (and the interaction was non-significant, 
see below). Thus, this strategy did not have a noticeable impact on name-verification 
performance. 
Name-verification. 
One participant’s data were removed because of a computer failure during one of 
the name-verification tasks, so name-verification data from 13 participants were 
analysed. All incorrect and missed responses were removed before analysing the data. In 
addition, non-matching trials where the name and image came from different conditions 
(e.g. name of dissimilar vehicle and image of similar animal) were removed since the 
effects of category and similarity could not be separated for these trials. The remaining 
data were combined across matching and non-matching trials. Since our use of response 
deadlines obliged participants to respond within a particular time frame, we expect any 
variation in RTs to be minimal and the strongest effects should be observed in accuracy. 
Nevertheless, we also analysed RT data to check that the pattern of results was consistent. 
Extreme RTs, defined as more than 3 times the interquartile range from the upper or 
lower quartiles, were excluded from each participant’s data. Again, F1 denotes the 
analyses by participants and F2 denotes the analyses by image. 
The short deadline had the intended effect of decreasing accuracy and shortening 
response times. Accuracy was poorer at the short deadline, F1(1, 12) = 25.04, MSE = 
22.30, p < .001; F2(1, 12) = 70.23, MSE = 25.84, p < .001. Since the short deadline 
obliged participants to respond faster, RTs were significantly faster, F1(1, 12) = 81.08, 
MSE = 1020.42, p < .001, F2(1, 12) = 1381.79, MSE = 17.91, p < .001. This pattern is 
shown in Figures 1 and 2. 
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There was a significant effect of similarity on accuracy and RT. Accuracy was 
significantly poorer, F1(1, 12) = 27.66, MSE = 12.16, p < .001, F2(1, 12) = 14.36, MSE = 
76.09, p < .003 and RTs were significantly slower for the similar conditions, F1(1, 12) = 
28.07, MSE = 90.59, p < .001, F2(1, 12) = 16.70, MSE = 52.37, p < .002. This pattern is 
shown in Figures 1 and 2. In addition, there was no effect of category on accuracy or RT, 
all F ≤ .44, p ≥ .52. There was a significant interaction between deadline, category and 
similarity on RT by image, F2(1, 12) = 4.77, MSE = 17.91, p < .05, but not by 
participants, F1(1, 12) = .68, p = .43. Figure 2 indicates that there was a trend for the 
effect of similarity to be greatest for the vehicles at the long deadline. However, since this 
interaction was only observed in the analysis by image, we can assume that there were 
not enough participants showing this pattern of responses for the effect to be significant 
by participants. The data from individual participants revealed that 5 out of 13 
participants showed a larger similarity effect for the vehicles. In fact, two of these 
participants responded particularly slowly for the similar vehicles at the long deadline 
(mean 434ms and 436ms, the slowest mean RTs for any participant, in any condition). 
Thus, a subset of participants showed a greater similarity effect for the vehicles. There 
were no other significant interactions, all F ≤ 2.45, p ≥ .14. 
In sum, these results replicate the findings of Shapiro and Olson (2005). We 
found clear effects of similarity on accuracy and RT, alongside non-significant effects of 
category. This pattern, as in Shapiro and Olson, was consistent across both long and short 
deadline conditions.  
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Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, we aimed to determine whether these strong effects of similarity 
observed in the mixed design of Experiment 1, were diminished when stimuli were 
presented in blocked sets. We conducted a post-hoc power analysis using GPOWER 
(Faul & Erdfelder, 1992) to assess the power of Experiment 2 to detect an equivalent 
effect of similarity, as found in Experiment 1. The effect size of similarity in Experiment 
1 was large, ηp2 = 0.70 for both accuracy and RT analyses. With 32 participants, the 
power of Experiment 2 to detect an effect of this size was 0.97. Thus, we had a 97% 
probability of correctly rejecting a false null hypothesis in Experiment 2. 
Training. 
On average, the number of responses per image needed to reach criterion was 
slightly less for Experiment 2 than Experiment 1 (33 responses per image in Experiment 
2 compared with 43 responses per image in Experiment 1). However, accuracy over the 
whole training session was similar for the two designs (see Tables 1 and 2). The 
percentage of correct responses in training was analysed. Although the means shown in 
Table 2 indicate that accuracy was slightly poorer for the similar conditions, this did not 
reach significance, F1(1, 28) = 3.20, p = .09, F2(1,12) = 1.4, p = .26. Unlike Experiment 
1, there was no significant advantage for the dissimilar images in training. As in 
Experiment 1, there was no significant effect of category, both F ≤ 1.06, p ≥ .33, and no 
significant interaction, both F ≤ 1.11, p ≥ .30. 
Name-verification. 
As in Experiment 1, non-matching trials that crossed conditions were removed, 
and the remaining data were combined across matching and non-matching trials. All 
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incorrect and missed responses were removed before analysing the data and extreme RTs 
were excluded. Although we expected that learning a smaller group of images would lead 
to better overall performance, there was no clear overall advantage in accuracy for 
Experiment 2 (mean accuracy per participant, across both tasks, was 76% in both 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2). However, if we compare Figure 3 with Figure 1, it is 
clear that participants in Experiment 2 were slightly more accurate than participants in 
Experiment 1 for the long deadline condition, and slightly less accurate for the short 
deadline condition. It is possible that the shorter testing session of Experiment 2 (48 
trials, as opposed to 112) was adequate for participants to become accustomed to the long 
deadline, but did not allow participants to become as accustomed to the short deadline. 
Nevertheless, participants in Experiment 2 were performing well above chance levels at 
the short deadline. Although the mean accuracy for the short deadline task looks poor in 
Figure 3, this is because the scores represent the number of correct, non-missed trials out 
of all missed and non-missed trials. If we remove all missed trials from our calculation, 
and instead measure the number of correct non-missed trials out of all non-missed trials, 
it is clear that participants were performing very accurately, when they managed to 
respond in time, scoring, on average, 89% for the long deadline task and 79% for the 
short deadline task. 
The only significant main effect was of deadline. Accuracy was significantly 
poorer for the short deadline, F1(1, 28) = 78.48, MSE = 67.27, p < .001; F2(1,12) = 
112.54, MSE = 23.45, p < .001 and RTs were significantly faster, F1(1, 28) = 137.87, 
MSE = 718.53, p <  .001; F2(1, 12) = 629.63, MSE = 77.99, p < .001. This pattern is 
shown in Figures 3 and 4. Unlike Experiment 1, Experiment 2 revealed no significant 
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effect of similarity on accuracy or on RT, all F ≤ 2.22, p ≥ .15. Consistent with 
Experiment 1, there were no main effects of category on accuracy or RT, all F ≤ 1.74, p ≥ 
.21. There was a significant interaction between deadline and similarity on RT by image, 
F2(1, 12) = 7.16, MSE = 77.99, p < .02, but not by participants, F2(1, 12) = 1.23, p = .28. 
As shown in Figure 4, performance was slightly faster, on average, for the similar 
conditions at the short deadline but the similar and dissimilar conditions were equal at the 
long deadline. In addition, Figure 3 indicates a trend for an interaction between similarity 
and deadline on accuracy. Specifically, the effect of similarity on accuracy appears to be 
greater for the long deadline task. However, the interaction between deadline and 
similarity on accuracy was non-significant, F1(1, 12) = 0.97, p <  .33; F2(1, 12) = 1.39, p 
< .26. We can therefore assume that not enough participants showed this trend to give a 
significant interaction. The results from individual participants indicate that the mean 
score for the similar animals condition was dragged down by one participant who scored 
only 60% for the long deadline task, whereas the next lowest score for this condition in 
this task was 69%. Note that accuracy for this participant only dropped to 58% in the 
short deadline task, so their performance was fairly accurate overall. 
There was also a significant interaction between category and similarity on RT by 
image, F2(1, 12) = 8.51, MSE = 233.32, p < .01, but not by participants, F1(1, 28) = 2.46, 
p = .13. As shown in Figure 4, there was a trend for RTs to be faster for the similar 
animals than the dissimilar animals, but slower for the similar vehicles than the dissimilar 
vehicles. However, this interaction was only significant by image, indicating that this 
effect was driven by a sub-set of participants. Comparing Figures 3 and 4, it is clear that 
this trend goes in the opposite direction for accuracy. Thus, there is a tendency for some 
 21
participants in the dissimilar-animals condition to prioritise accuracy over speed, but for 
some participants in the similar-animals condition to prioritise speed over accuracy, and 
vice versa for the vehicle conditions. However, the interaction on accuracy did not reach 
significance, F1(1, 28) = 1.23, p = .28; F2(1, 12) = 3.21, p = .10. All other interactions 
were non-significant, all F ≤ 3.19, p ≥ .10. 
Discussion 
Summary of results 
The effects of similarity were consistent and strong in Experiment 1 (mixed 
design) but non-significant in Experiment 2 (blocked design). Thus, the context of the 
testing set can mediate the influence of similarity on name-learning and name-
verification performance. However, we observed no effects of category in either 
experiment. This is in accordance with Shapiro and Olson’s (2005) findings, and 
indicates that perceptual similarity, as opposed to semantic category is likely to be the 
main cause of apparent processing differences between living and non-living categories. 
Nevertheless, our study used artificial examples of living and non-living objects, and it 
remains possible that an influence of semantic category would be observed if examples of 
real objects were used. This issue is discussed in the Category Effects section, below. 
Similarity Effects 
The results from Experiment 1 add to existing evidence that high levels of 
similarity have a detrimental effect on normal naming performance (Gaffan & Heywood, 
1993; Humphreys et al., 1988; Lloyd-Jones & Humphreys, 1997; Shapiro & Olson, 2005; 
Vitkovitch & Tyrrell, 1995). According to Humphreys et al.’s cascade model of visual 
object recognition, high levels of perceptual similarity affect processing during access to 
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stored structural descriptions. Since processing happens in cascade, perceptually similar 
structural descriptions that are activated along with the target continue to be activated 
during semantic processing, and therefore impact on the ease with which the target is 
identified and named. The aim of the current study was to investigate whether the 
influence of similarity was mediated in different contexts. Specifically, we investigated 
whether blocked presentation caused objects to be perceived as less similar, causing 
fewer highly similar structural descriptions to be activated, allowing the target description 
to be accessed more quickly and facilitating the naming process.  
Context Effects 
Previous investigations of similarity and context have focussed on how 
judgements of similarity between objects are mediated by the context of the comparison 
episode (Bassock & Medin, 1997; Goldsone et al, 1997; Medin, et al., 1993; Tversky, 
1977). Our aim was to investigate whether these context effects impact on object 
discriminability, mediating the effects of perceptual similarity on object naming. We 
anticipated that participants’ perception of the similarity between objects could be 
manipulated through changing the context of the testing set. This hypothesis was based 
on evidence of an interaction between conceptual and perceptual processes (Livingston et 
al., 1998; Gauthier et al., 2003; Hayes et al., 2002) and in particular, evidence that object 
discriminability changes according to task demands (Goldstone, 1994). In addition, we 
predicted that these changes in the discriminability of items should impact on the naming 
process (according to the cascade model, Humphreys et al., 1988). We investigated 
context effects by comparing participants’ naming performance for the same images, 
presented in mixed vs. blocked sets. 
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In Experiment 1, when participants were trained to learn names for a set of similar 
novel objects and another set of dissimilar novel objects together, their name-learning 
and name-verification performance was worse for the set of similar objects. These effects 
of similarity in the mixed design experiment were consistent and strong. However, in 
Experiment 2, the similar sets of objects no longer had a detrimental effect on naming 
when similar and dissimilar images were presented separately. Participants were 
apparently able to factor out common features and concentrate just on the dimensions that 
were important for discriminating object identity (effectively spreading exemplars over a 
larger psychological range, as predicted by Parducci, 1965). These findings provide 
support for the weak view of similarity as a context-dependent process (Goldstone & 
Barsalou, 1998, Goldsone et al, 1997, Medin et al., 1993). Nevertheless, our findings do 
not undermine the role of similarity in category-specific effects. Instead, we argue that 
similarity has a powerful influence on naming, but that perceptions of similarity are 
context-specific. 
Research on base rates in category learning suggests that the frequency with 
which items are displayed in the training set can affect the way attention is allocated to 
features (Kruschke, 1996). Specifically, frequent categories are encoded by their typical 
features and rare categories by their distinctive features. Thus, items are encoded 
differently, depending on their frequency, and this affects the perceived similarity among 
items. Similarly, in our study, participants may have allocated attention to features 
differently when items were presented in mixed or blocked sets. In the blocked design, 
the items had many common features that could be ignored, and therefore attending to the 
remaining crucial features that differed would have decreased the perceived similarity 
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between items. In contrast, in the mixed design, the images that share common features 
formed only a subset of the images in the set, making it impossible to attend to only a few 
distinctive features. Thus, when participants could not simply attend to a few distinctive 
features in the mixed design, similar items were harder to name.  
An interesting interpretation of the mixed design results is that the range 
(Parducci, 1965) was determined by the entire stimuli set, rather than by each category in 
the set. If participants were able to subdivide their psychological range into animals and 
vehicles or similar and dissimilar, this could have eliminated any effects of similarity, 
even in the mixed design. However, this was not the case. The addition of dissimilar 
items alongside similar items meant that participants were unable to “block” the similar 
category and just focus on the features that changed. In fact, the number of dissimilar 
items necessary to eliminate the effects of blocking was very small. A set containing just 
4 dissimilar and 4 similar items was sufficient to cause difficulties in processing the 
similar items. 
The context of the testing set may have had a greater influence on the results 
because of our training and name-verification paradigm and the use of novel images. The 
extensive training session ensured that the objects in the testing set were much more 
likely to be brought to mind than other objects from long-term memory. In addition, 
similarity within a set is likely to have a stronger impact in a name-verification task than 
in normal naming. In the name-verification task, the participant was shown a name 
followed by an image and the task was to decide whether they matched. Since the names 
and images were always taken from the testing set, the participant was constantly making 
within-set comparisons and this may have encouraged confusions within the set over 
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confusions with other objects in long-term memory. Finally, the set of novel images 
would have been perceived as a coherent group of unfamiliar objects, separate from other 
real-life objects the participants would have regularly encountered. This may have 
increased the likelihood of confusions within the set relative to confusions with other 
real-life objects. 
Category effects 
We found no effects of semantic category in either Experiment 1 or Experiment 2 
supporting the hypothesis that perceptual similarity could cause apparent processing 
differences between objects from living and non-living categories (e.g. Gaffan & 
Heywood, 1993; Gerlach, 2001; Humphreys et al., 1988; Lloyd-Jones & Humphreys, 
1997; Lloyd-Jones & Luckhurst, 2002; Shapiro & Olson, 2005). In addition, we found 
that the blocked design eliminated the similarity effect for both the animal and vehicle 
conditions, demonstrating that perceptual similarity, as opposed to other characteristics 
particular to living things, is affected by context. 
Nevertheless, because we used artificial examples of living and non-living things 
in our study, we cannot preclude the possibility that some influence of category exists 
and this influence could vary in different contexts. Although Shapiro and Olson (2005) 
provided evidence that participants processed our novel images appropriately in off-line 
tasks, we cannot be entirely sure that participants were processing the stimuli in the same 
way as real things during our naming task. Thus, a more certain way to measure 
processing differences would be to use pictures of real things. Although it would not be 
possible to perfectly match the stimuli for perceptual similarity, future studies could 
investigate whether blocked presentation improves performance for similar items from 
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both living and non-living categories. The findings would depend on how susceptible 
identification judgements are to a stimulus set. If each picture of a real object were only 
presented once, other stimuli in the set would be unlikely to influence the object 
recognition process. Instead, structural descriptions of objects from the participant’s long-
term memory store would be more likely to interfere with the process. In contrast, if each 
picture were repeated many times, the participant would be very likely to build up a “set” 
of objects in memory, and structural descriptions of objects from this set would be more 
readily activated and therefore more likely to interfere with the recognition process. In 
addition, using a name-verification task would also increase the chance of confusions 
within the stimulus set, since participants are constantly asked to compare pairs of objects 
from the set when they are presented with an image and a name in each trial. If we find 
that blocking real images diminishes the influence of similarity, this paradigm could 
overcome the problem of controlling for similarity and semantic category independently. 
Even if the living and non-living items were not matched for similarity, the effects of 
similarity in the mixed design would disappear in the blocked design, revealing any 
remaining differences in performance that were due to semantic category alone. 
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Appendix A 
Dissimilar and Similar Novel Animals and Vehicles, Labelled AD1 to VS4 (from 
Shapiro & Olson, 2005) 
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Similar (AS) 
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Appendix B 
Names for Images (from Shapiro & Olson, 2005) 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
Bruka Shoni Dronu Flipi 
Zidle Kimba Vulsa  Jutle 
Denil Pukid Fulag Gigip 
Trolb Glond Chask Skung 
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Table 1 
Means and SDs (Standard Deviations) for Accuracy in the Training Session of 
Experiment 1 
 Mean % correct 
Dissimilar Animals 88.72 (4.71) 
Similar Animals 80.48 (9.30) 
Dissimilar Vehicles 85.31 (7.37) 
Similar Vehicles 80.98 (7.55) 
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Table 2  
Means and SDs for Accuracy in the Training Session of Experiment 2 
 Mean % correct 
Dissimilar Animals 88.14 (9.35) 
Similar Animals 80.68 (8.21) 
Dissimilar Vehicles 87.62 (5.84) 
Similar Vehicles 85.69 (5.60) 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Mean name-verification accuracy for each condition in Experiment 1, with 
standard error (S.E.) bars. 
Figure 2. Mean name-verification RT for each condition in Experiment 1, with S.E. bars. 
Figure 3. Mean name-verification accuracy for each condition in Experiment 2, with S.E. 
bars. 
Figure 4. Mean name-verification RT for each condition in Experiment 3, with S.E. bars.
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